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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The total expenditure on healthcare and the cost as a percentage of GDP have 
increased steadily for years in most of countries, e.g., U.S. healthcare costs per capita 
increased from $4,878 in 2000 to $9,523 in 2014, and from 13.8% in 2000 to 17.5% in 
2014 as the percentage of GDP and total amount is $3 trillion. National Health 
Expenditure-GDP ratio for developed countries like Germany and Switzerland is around 
11%. Medicare spending is $618.7 billion in 2014, it accounts for 20 percent of total 
National Health Expenditure and grows by 5.5% compared to 2013 (NHE Fact Sheet, 
Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services). 
Medicare 
Medicare is a public health care program, which is supported by the Federal 
government for people aged 65 years or above and certain people aged under 65 years with 
disabilities. It plays a major role in providing health care service to the beneficiaries, and 
includes Medicare Part A, Part B, Part C and Part D.  
Part A is the hospital insurance, which covers inpatient care in hospitals, including 
critical access hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. But long-term care is not included in 
Part A. Part B is the medical insurance, which covers outpatient care. Part C plans, which 
are known as Medicare Advantage plans, are offered through approved private insurance 
companies by Medicare. The newest addition to the Medicare family, Part D, is the 
prescription drug plan, which is optional and available to people enrolled in Parts A, B and 
most of Part C plans.  
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For an individual or his/her spouse who paid Medicare tax for at least 40 quarters 
(10 years) while working, there is no premium for Part A. Most of people need to pay 
premium if they are enrolled in Part B and Part D.  
Part C (Medicare Advantage) plans are provided by private insurance companies. 
Medicare Advantage plans offer benefits of Part A and Part B and most of the Medicare 
Advantage plans also offer prescription drug coverage. Individuals can choose from HMO 
(Health Maintenance Organization), PPO (Preferred Provider Organization), Private FFS 
(Fee-for-Service), Special Needs Plan, and Medicare MSA (Medical Saving Account). 
Medicare is not a comprehensive coverage and there is substantial amount of 
expenses, which are not compensated. Beneficiaries could choose supplemental insurance 
to cover the some of the "gaps" between total cost and reimbursed cost by Medicare.  
Medigap 
 Medigap is also known as Medicare Supplemental Insurance, which is provided by 
private insurance companies used to cover some of the cost sharing required by original 
Medicare plan, for instance, deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments when using original 
Medicare.   
Starting from 1992 the policies provided by insurance companies are standardized, and 
using single letters to represent various plans. Some plans only provide basic coverage, and 
some provide more advanced coverage.  Insurance companies do not necessarily need to 
provide all possible plans. Medigap plan A is an necessity if insurance companies sell 
Medigap coverage and other advanced plans are optional.   
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 Medigap market is highly regulated by the Federal government.  Government 
restricts insurance companies to use pre-existing condition for risk classification during 
open enrollment period. Insurance companies have very limited information to use for the 
underwriting process.  Therefore, strict regulation leads to severe information asymmetry 
and Medigap market would be an appropriate field to investigate economic problems 
caused by asymmetric information.  
 Overall, individuals can have two general options. One is to choose Part A plus 
Part B (optional) plus Part D (optional) plus Medigap coverage (optional). The other one is 
a Medicare Advantage plan. Any insurance company selling Medigap coverage to those 
who enrolled in Medicare Advantage plan is illegal. 
1.2 Why Choosing Medigap Market to Examine Selection Effect 
 In a market with mandatory coverage, it is not allowed for people to step out of the 
market. Therefore there is no way to observe individuals' selection effect.  Thus, a 
voluntarily chosen insurance is one basic requirement for investigating selection effect. 
 In voluntary insurance market with symmetric information, insurance companies 
would classify individuals and charge different premiums according to their classification 
outcome.  Under this circumstance, there is no selection effect. In voluntary insurance 
market without government regulation and with asymmetric information, insurance 
companies take advantage of information, which is used to classify individuals. Meanwhile, 
individuals can use some private information that cannot be observed by insurance 
companies to make choice of insurance coverage. In this scenario, selection effect by 
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individuals and the screening by insurance companies are mingled. Thus, it is less likely to 
evaluate the selection effect. 
 However, when government intervenes insurance market and restricts the 
information that insurance companies can use, this problem is simplified since screening 
by the insurance companies are avoided and behaviors from demand side are isolated. 
Medigap insurance market falls into this category. 
 Firstly, Medigap is optional to those who are covered by Medicare Part A and Part 
B.  Secondly, government intervention limits the information, which can be used by the 
insurance companies. In other words, information in Medigap insurance market is 
asymmetric.  
1.3 Economic Consequences of Asymmetric Information in Medigap Insurance 
Market 
 Main consequence of asymmetric information is the market failure. Perfect 
symmetric information is the ideal case and unrealistic. Usually, it is hard for buyers and 
seller to know each other perfectly. When there are restrictions in insurance underwritings, 
it makes more unbalanced asymmetric information.  
Insurance contracts made based on asymmetric information may attract people with high-
risk type and drive people with low-risk type out of market. According to Akerlof (1970), 
the problem caused by adverse selection harms efficiency and leads to market collapse in 
some extreme case. Also, the existence of moral hazard makes the problem even worse.  
Moral hazard means that those who have insurance are less likely to take any preventative 
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activities and the probability of loss occurrence can be consequently increased or if loss 
occurs beneficiaries tend to over-use health care.   
 Medigap insurance has been accused by some policymakers since it encourages 
beneficiaries to consume more health care than what they actually need and therefore the 
expenditure of Medicare is higher than it should be. Especially some Medigap plans offer 
first dollar coverage, and beneficiaries who have incentive will tend to consume 
unnecessary services covered by Medicare. In order to reduce the growth rate of Medicare 
spending, some policymakers propose to discourage the purchase of Medigap coverage. 
1.4 Research Questions  
 In this study, we seek to answer several questions by analyzing the MEPS (Medical 
Expenditure Panel Study) data in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
 First, do individuals assess their risk in the correct way? We examine whether 
individuals have private information on their risk type to find the answer of this question. 
 Second, on average, who are more likely to purchase Medigap insurance--those 
with high risk type or low risk type? We study the statistical relationship between Medigap 
insurance purchase and self-rated health factors for this.  
 Third, is there any moral hazard in Medigap insurance market, does it have large 
impact if existed? We explore moral hazard indirectly by seeking to answer the previous 
two questions. 
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the previous 
literature that investigates selection effect and Medigap insurance market. The theoretical 
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model is elaborated in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 and 5, we describe the data source, study 
sample selection and explain log-linear regression model, Probit model, seemingly 
unrelated regression model and EM algorithm. Data analysis and corresponding empirical 
results are shown in Chapter 6. Some potential problems are discussed in Chapter 7 and 
finally we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Health Insurance Market 
 Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) use Retirement History Survey (RHS) from 1977 to 
1979 with 2,059 observations to investigate moral hazard and selection effect in Medigap 
insurance market. Three dimensional ex post loss, including hospital expenses, physician 
care expenditure and prescription drug expenses has been examined.  They claim that 
evidence of adverse selection is found and the size of the effect is so small that it does not 
lead to severe efficiency problem.   Also, they find that there is strong positive correlation 
between wealth and insurance demand.  
 Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) investigate Medigap insurance market by 
combining data sets of Medicare Current Beneficiaries Survey (MCBS) and Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS). They find that the total medical expenditure is $4,000 less for 
those with Medigap coverage comparing with those without Medigap coverage conditional 
on Medigap price. When controlling health status in addition to Medigap price, those with 
Medigap coverage tend to spend $2,000 more comparing with those without Medigap 
coverage.  They claim that these two findings together indicate that there is advantageous 
selection in Medigap insurance market. Furthermore, they point out that the cognitive 
ability plays an important role in leading to the advantageous selection. The factor of risk 
preference, which has been focused and discussed for a long time, seems to be of less 
importance in Medigap market.   
 Buchmueller et al. (2006) examine private health insurance market in Australia. 
They find that individuals with private health insurance are typically in better health status 
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and have less physician visits comparing with those without private health insurance, and 
there is no significant difference of hospital utilization between those with and without 
private health insurance. Therefore, they claim that their findings support advantageous 
selection rather than adverse selection due to strict underwriting regulation. They show the 
evidence that risk aversion and income are the factors that lead to advantageous selection. 
 Ciro Avitabile (2009) uses data of 2004 and 2006 from Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe to study the selection effect of individuals between age 50 and 
75 in eight European countries. They use bivariate Probit model to analyze the data, and 
there is no significant positive correlation between the probability of owing private 
insurance coverage and the probability of ex post risk in terms of hospital treatment. 
However, they find that the survival probability is significantly positive correlated with the 
probability of signing a private hospital insurance and significantly negative correlated 
with the probability of overnight stay in hospital. This implies the existence of 
advantageous selection. Also, they claim that education and cognitive skills are two 
potential sources of advantageous selection.  
 Valetino Dardanoni and Paolo Li Donni (2012) study incentive and selection effect 
in Medigap insurance market using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 2002, 2004 and 
2006. They examine the correlation between Medigap coverage and the utilization of 
health care in terms of inpatient care. They find that modest incentive effect and significant 
selection effect include both adverse selection and advantageous selection since residual 
heterogeneity is multidimensional.  
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2.2 Life Insurance Market 
 Correlation between life insurance and morality rate is analyzed in Mahdavi (2005). 
They consider both risk type and risk aversion and find that processing cost could affect 
individuals' choice of life insurance. They claim that if individuals are sufficient risk 
averse to reduce the mortality rate and processing cost is large enough, advantageous 
selection will show up in the insurance market, and if risk aversion is not sufficient enough 
to decrease the mortality rate to certain critical value and processing cost is not large 
enough, there would be adverse selection in the insurance market.  
 Yao, Schmit and Sydnor (2012) use data from the developing country Pakistan to 
analyze the relationship between claim history and renewal decision in a micro health 
insurance market. They find that households with more claim amount filed in the previous 
period are slightly more likely to renew their insurance in current period. However, 
comparing to those who are newly enrolled in current period renewed households are 
significantly less risky due to less claims filed and less amount of claim filed. Therefore, 
the risk type evolves with time and this scenario is advantageous in the insurance market.  
 Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997) empirically investigate importance of selection effect 
in two entities. One is Group Commission of Massachusetts, and the other is Harvard 
University. Harvard University provides equal contribution across plans. Under the equal 
contribution rules, PPO is driven into death spiral and crashes finally within three years 
due to adverse selection effect. Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts subsidizes 
85% premium regardless of plan cost, which does not result in death spiral of certain plan. 
However, it still leads to severe adverse selection effect.  
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2.3 Long-Term Care Insurance Market  
 Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) study the long-term care insurance market. 
Significant correlation between long-term care insurance and long-term care use is not 
found. However, they argue that lack of correlation does not necessarily mean that there is 
no asymmetric information. They show evidence that there is adverse selection on risk 
type and advantageous selection on risk preference. In general, there are two groups of 
people who are more likely to purchase long term care insurance: individuals who are 
high-risk type and individuals who are highly risk averse. The latter ones are less 
correlated with risk occurrence. Therefore, in this work, the risk almost cancels out with 
each other and it looks like there is no correlation. They also suggest a general framework 
to test asymmetric information in insurance market, which will be adopted in our 
dissertation as well.  
2.4 Automobile Insurance Market 
 Chiappori and Salanié (2000) investigate asymmetric information in French auto 
insurance market. They concentrate on less experienced drivers in order to keep the 
individuals more homogeneous in terms of knowing their risk type. Using independent 
Probit model, bivariate Probit model and nonparametric model, they find no evidence to 
support existence of adverse selection.   
 Cohen and Einav (2005) study Israel auto insurance market. They examine both 
less experienced and experienced drivers. Their findings for less experienced drivers are 
consistent with those in Chiappori and Salanié (2000). It seems that less experience drivers 
in Israel do not have advantage on their risk type comparing with insurance company could 
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obtain. Therefore, there is no evidence for existence of adverse selection in less 
experienced drivers. However, it is another story for the experienced drivers. They do find 
that those with over three years driving experience have more private information than 
those insurance companies can control. They find that there is positive correlation between 
average number of claims and insurance coverage even after controlling many 
characteristics of policyholders. 
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CHAPTET 3 THEORTTICAL TERMINOLOGIES 
3.1 Selection Effect 
 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) develop models that analyze market equilibrium 
under imperfect information through studying imperfect information in insurance market. 
They assume that the individual heterogeneity in terms of the probability of loss 
occurrence is alone. Charging the same averaged insured premium for different risk types 
would gradually drive those with relatively low risk out of the market and finally the whole 
market collapses. Therefore, pooling equilibrium does not exist in imperfect insurance 
market. If there were market equilibrium, it would be a separate equilibrium. In the 
separate equilibrium, those with high-risk type buy full coverage insurance and those with 
low-risk type buy partial coverage insurance or those with high-risk type buy insurance 
and those with low-risk type choose not to buy insurance. This separate market equilibrium 
demonstrates that levels of insurance coverage are adversely selected by individuals, and 
this is characterized as "positive correlation" between risk type and insurance coverage.   
 Later, this "positive correlation property" forms the basis for testing of selection 
effect by extensive empirical literature in different insurance markets. In some of them 
there is evidence to support this positive correlation, but there is not in others.  Thus, the 
assumption that there is only uni-dimensional private information on risk type has been 
questioned by the seemingly contradicting results.  
 Hemenway (1990) modifies the theory by introducing the concept propitious 
selection, which emphasizes another piece of private information--the taste for risk. He 
summarizes the assumptions for adverse selection in this way: insurance purchase is not 
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mandatory; individuals are heterogeneous in risk type and this is known by themselves but 
not known by insurance companies. Therefore, insurance companies charge different risk-
typed individuals with the same price. In other words, it means that insurance companies 
are not able to screen individuals, and propitious selection needs two more assumptions on 
top of the assumptions for adverse selection. One is that individuals are heterogeneous in 
tastes for risk and their taste are consistent across physical and financial dimensions. The 
other is that individuals could affect their risk by positive or negative actions or attitude in 
some extent.    
 De Meza and Webb (2001) theoretically show a similar idea, and they define 
advantageous selection in basis of individuals heterogeneous in both risk and risk 
preference. Also, risk preference is endogenous with risk precautionary activities.  
 In general, any private information that is positive correlated with insurance 
coverage and negative correlated with risk could potentially lead to negative correlation 
between risk type and insurance coverage if its effect is large enough.  
 Therefore, in order to investigate selection effect, it is paramount to know whether 
private information is one-dimensional or multi-dimensional.  When there is multi-
dimensional private information, for instance, besides risk type there is risk preference (not 
limited to risk preference) that is positively correlated with insurance coverage and 
negatively correlated with risk type, this could attenuate the positive correlation between 
risk type and insurance coverage. If it is large enough, it could even reverse the sign of the 
correlation between risk type and insurance coverage. Suppose there were no moral hazard 
in this case, then average expenditure of individuals with insurance is lower than the 
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average expenditure of those without insurance , which is defined as advantageous 
selection (Fang et al, 2008)  
Suppose there is pure selection effect and risk type is the only dimensional private 
information of individuals, individual's choice of insurance coverage can be described by 
the following formula, 
 = (|), 
where  is level of insurance coverage,  is information that individuals have and   stands 
for risk types.  The function of  is monotonically increasing function with respect to  
conditional on . 
 Individual evaluates his/her risk type and makes decision on choosing insurance 
coverage accordingly.  When information is more than one-dimensional, the corresponding 
formula can be described in this way: 
 = 	(, |), 
 
where  is a vector that includes all characteristics other than risk type, which correlates 
with choice of insurance coverage and risk type. Therefore, the insurance coverage level is 
determined not only by risk type but also other factors when certain individual makes 
choices of insurance.   
 This is more complicated comparing with the one-dimensional private information 
case, and relying on positive correlation test would be not enough to handle the situation 
with more than one-dimensional private information since risk type increase does not 
necessarily increase insurance coverage level. Positive correlation test between risk type 
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and insurance coverage under this circumstance without considering other potential factors 
will be also problematic due to endogeneity problem. 
 Empirically, individuals' risk type is a latent variable. Testing correlation between 
risk type and insurance coverage exists only in ideal theoretical case. In realistic cases, 
frequently used variable of proxy risk type is realized loss.  The issue introduced by using 
realized loss is that realized loss reflects not only selection effect but also moral hazard if 
there is any. Not rejecting existence of positive correlation between insurance coverage 
and realized loss could not tell us that the correlation is derived from pure adverse 
selection, pure moral hazard or both without further investigation.  
3.2 Moral Hazard 
 Moral hazard can be divided into ex ante moral hazard and ex post moral hazard. 
Generally speaking, it reflects an incentive effect due to having insurance. In the case of ex 
ante moral hazard, health insurance companies would give policyholders incentive to take 
less precautious activities before occurrence of loss, and if policyholders use more health 
care than what they actually need after loss occurrence, ex post moral hazard occurs.  
 Ex ante moral hazard endogenously increases risk type.  Ex post moral hazard leads 
to over consumption of health care. However, it does not essentially change the risk type.   
Ex ante moral hazard appears more often in market like automobile insurance market and 
less often in health related insurance market. Therefore, in this empirical work we assume 
there is no ex ante moral hazard and whenever moral hazard is mentioned, we mean ex 
post moral hazard.  
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3.3 Selection Effect and Moral Hazard 
 The whole story of moral hazard and selection effect can be described as follows. 
First of all, individuals select insurance coverage according to their information of risk 
type, risk preference and/or other relevant factors they have.  Some of them choose full 
coverage, some of them choose less coverage, and others may end up no coverage. After 
choices being made, if those who have insurance become more reckless (choosing less 
healthy) comparing those who have no insurance increases their risk type and this situation 
is ex ante moral hazard.  Once loss occurs, insured individuals consume more health care 
than what they actually need due to holding the coverage of health insurance and ex post 
moral hazard happens. The timeline of the whole procedure is described in Figure 3.1. 
 If adverse selection exists in the insurance market, the existence of moral hazard 
will strengthen the positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post loss. If 
there is advantageous selection in the insurance market, the existence of moral hazard will 
attenuate its effect. Positive or negative overall correlation depends on whether the 
magnitude of advantageous selection is larger than the moral hazard or not.  
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Figure 3.1 The Timeline of Selection Effect and Moral Hazard 
 
  
 
18
CHAPTER 4 DATA 
4.1 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is sponsored by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality started in 1996. There are two major components in 
MEPS. One is called Household Component (MEPS-HC or HC), and the other is called 
Insurance Component (MEPS-IC or IC). MEPS-HC is a subsample of households that 
participated previous year's NHIS (National Health Interview Survey). Each year a new 
panel of households is selected, and it is followed for two consecutive years with 5 rounds 
of interviews of non-institutionalized U.S population. We use MEPS-HC data in our study. 
The data includes demographic information, health care services, health status, health care 
expenditures, insurance information, employment status, income, etc. 
4.2 Sample selection and Sample size 
 In this study, we compare respondents, who are older than 65, have Medicare Part 
A and Part B but do not have Medigap insurance with respondents, who are older than 65, 
have Medicare Part A and Part B and choose to purchase Medigap coverage voluntarily.  
 Initially, we identify those who are covered by Medicare Part A and Part B, since 
Medigap is the supplemental insurance for Medicare. Only individuals that are covered by 
Part A and Part B are eligible for purchasing Medigap coverage. Then individuals, who 
have Medicare Part A and Part B and do not have any private insurance, are considered as 
no Medigap coverage (coded as Medigap=0).  Individuals with Part A and Part B, who 
report to have Medigap and pay the premium fully on their own or by family members, are 
considered as having Medigap (coded as Medigap=1). We exclude those who have 
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Medigap coverage and whose part of or the entire coverage premium is paid by their/their 
spouse's employers or their/their spouse's former employers, since it is ambiguous whether 
individuals would purchase Medigap coverage without subsidy from their/their spouse's 
employers or their/their spouse's former employers. Detailed conditions for construction of 
variable of Medigap are shown in Table 4.1.   
 MEPS collect a new panel of sample households each year, and this panel of 
households are followed for two calendar years. It is an overlapping panel design. 
Therefore, for each calendar year you can observe two different groups of sample. In this 
study we will not take advantage of the panel design.  We use data from the year of 2009, 
2010 and 2011 and only do cross-sectional analysis without stacking different years' data 
together.  
4.3 Variables 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
 One dependent variable we use in the regression model is the total health 
expenditure.  The range of the total health expenditure is [0, 247,828] in 2009, [0, 207,213] 
in 2010 and [0, 209,265] in 2011 respectively. All the data points in the sample are non-
negative and sample distribution is skewed. Therefore, in order to make the distribution of 
the data better to fit the normal distribution assumption, we take the logarithm of the total 
health expenditure later in the regression analysis.   
 There are 113 observations with total expenditure equal to 0 in 2009, 122 in 2010, 
and 126 in 2011 respectively. Taking the logarithm of them will make the value negative 
infinity. In order to satisfy the normal distribution assumption of our linear regression 
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model and remove the logarithm singularity of zero, we smooth the point mass distribution 
of observations with zero total expenditure by assigning the values randomly drew from a 
uniform distribution ranged from zero to the nonzero minimum value. The sample 
distribution from year 2009 before and after taking logarithm with our above modification 
is shown in Figure 4.1.  
 Another dependent variable is purchasing or not purchasing Medigap coverage.  It 
is a binary variable with 1 reflecting holding Medigap coverage and 0 reflecting not 
holding Medigap coverage.  
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 Age, gender and smoking status are the variables that used by insurance company 
to set the premium. Thus these three variables and their interactions are added in the model 
in order to control the risk classification evaluated by insurance companies. We call this 
group of variables as "premium variables" from now on since they are used to set the 
premium by the insurance companies for Medigap coverage. 
 Self-rate health: this is a subjective health rate. It shows how would individuals rate 
their health status, and it is an ordinal categorical variable.  
 Poverty categories: it reflects the family income as percentage of poverty line. It 
directly shows the economic status of individuals. 
 Education: it shows the years of education when initially enrolling in MEPS. 
 Cognitive limitations: it shows whether individuals have limitations in cognitive 
ability. 
 Risk Aversion: it measures degree of individuals' risk aversion. 
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 Risk aversion, cognitive limitations, education and poverty categories are denoted 
as "additional variables" for short in later chapters. All descriptions of variables are shown 
in Table 4.2. 
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A. Sample Distribution before Taking Logarithm  
 
B. Sample Distribution after Taking Logarithm 
Figure 4.1 Sample Distributions of the Total Health Expenditure and the Logarithm 
of the Total Health Expenditure of 2009 data  
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Table 4.1 Construction of Variable Medigap 
   
Are you currently covered 
by Medicare health 
insurance? 
Yes Yes 
 
Part A of Medicare covers 
most hospital expenses. Part 
B covers many doctors 
expenses including doctor 
visits, and the premium is 
usually deducted from your 
Social Security. Are you 
covered under Part B of 
Medicare? 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Do you have Medigap 
Insurance? 
  
Yes 
 
No 
 
Including any help from 
your family, do you (or your 
(husband/wife/partner) pay 
all of the costs, some of the 
costs, or none of the costs of 
the premium for this health 
insurance coverage? 
 
All 
 
N/A 
 
Binary Variable "Medigap" 
 
1 
 
0 
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Table 4.2 Descriptions of Variables 
Name of Variables Variables Definition 
Age  Age in Years 
Female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
Smoke Currently smoke, 1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise. 
Education Years of Education 
1 - 8 ELEMENTARY GRADES 1 - 8 
9 - 11 HIGH SCHOOL GRADES 9 - 11 
12 GRADE 12 
13 1 YEAR COLLEGE 
14 2 YEARS COLLEGE 
15 3 YEARS COLLEGE 
16 4 YEARS COLLEGE 
17 5+ YEARS COLLEGE 
Married  Marital Status, 1 if married, 0 Otherwise. 
Race White, Black or Others 
Expenditure Total health expenditure 
Risk Aversion More likely to take risks 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Uncertain 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
 
SR Health Self-rated health status 
1 Excellent, 
2 Very Good 
3 Good  
4 Fair 
5 Poor 
Medigap Hold Medigap coverage, 1 if Yes, 0 
Otherwise 
PW Person Weight 
Cognition Cognitive limitations, 1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise. 
 
  
  
 
25
4.4 Survey Data 
4.4.1 Sampling 
 Simple random sampling is based on the assumption that each individual in the 
population has same probability to be selected into the sample.  Survey data is rarely 
collected as simple random sample due to the cost or time saving reason.  MEPS data is 
also not an exception. The data collected in MEPS-HC is based on a complex survey 
design. Therefore, we cannot treat data with complex survey design as simple random 
sample to reflect the general population. Weight, cluster and strata should be handled in the 
analysis to approximate a representative sample.  Misspecification of the sampling design 
could possibly result in incorrect point estimates with bad standard errors. 
4.4.2 Sample Weight, Cluster and Stratification 
 Sample weight is the inverse of the likelihood of being sampled when sampling is 
not random. When collecting data, some group may be under-sampled due to no response  
and some individuals and minority group may be over-sampled on purpose. Therefore, 
when sampling statistics are calculated, weighting adjustment is required. For example, the 
total initial respondents in our study are 2,344 for 2009, 2,274 for 2010, and 2,314 for 2011 
respectively. Due to the 0 sample weight, sample size is adjusted to 2,295 for 2009, 2,213 
for 2010, 2,256 for 2011 respectively, which is shown in Table 4.3. 
 In addition, when MEPS data are collected, cluster and stratum are used to save 
time and improve efficiency. In cluster sampling, a group of elements instead of a single 
element of population is used as primary sample units. Smaller group of elements or single 
elements are called secondary sample units, which depends on it is multi-stage sampling or 
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single stage sampling. In stratified design, population is sampled into well-defined group, 
and elements are independently sampled from each stratum. Cluster sampling usually lead 
to larger variance compared to simple random sampling and stratification usually lead to 
smaller variance compared to simple random sampling.  
 Both primary sample units (PSU) and stratification are used in MEPS data 
collection so that in our analysis we need to adjust variances and standard errors 
correspondingly. 
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Table 4.3 Detailed Data Sample Information 
 2009 2010 2011 
Sample Size 2,344 2,274 2,314 
 
Sample Size 
Used  
 
2,295  2,213 2,256 
Sample Sized 
Skipped Due 
To Non-
positive 
Weight 
 
Number of 
Strata 
 
Number of 
PSU 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
 
327 
  61 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
 
326 
                      58 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
 
 
 322 
Weighted 
Size for Used 
Observations 
24,070,044 24,662,204 
 
24,729,641 
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CHAPTER 5 STATISTICAL MODELING 
5.1 Conventional Positive Correlation Test 
As we have mentioned in Chapter 3, the positive correlation test investigate 
reduced form correlation between risk type and insurance coverage. When the private 
information is more than one dimensional, the result from model without controlling other 
informative factors can be misleading. However, positive correlation test still can be a 
good starting point.  
5.1.1 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 Our regression model of positive correlation test regressing logarithm of the total 
expenditure on Medigap coverage and premium variables is as follows:  
 =  +  +    (1) 
where    is the logarithm of the total health expenditure for each year,   is the binary 
variable reflects holding or not holding Medigap coverage and  is the vector of 
premium variables, including age, gender and smoking status and their interactions. This is 
the reduced form relation between Medigap coverage and the logarithm of the total health 
expenditure. The coefficient of  reflects the correlation between the logarithm of the total 
health expenditure and Medigap coverage when controlling premium variables for risk 
classification. 
 We use this model to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I: there exists the nonzero positive correlation between Medigap coverage and 
total health expenditure when controlling premium variables. 
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 In the above hypothesis, the null side  is zero correlation and the alternative one 
 is nonzero positive correlation.  
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Table 5.1 Coefficients and Standard Errors of variable Medigap from Positive 
Correlation Test in Year 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 2009 2010 2011 
Medigap  0.3855*** 
(0.1228) 
0.1642 
 (0.1842) 
0.2014 
(0.2535) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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As shown in Table 5.1, we find a positive correlation between the logarithm of the total 
expenditure and Medigap in all years of 2009, 2010 and 2011. According to the statistical 
-values, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for 2010 and 2011, but we are able to reject 
null hypothesis at 1% significant level for 2009.  
 Without further investigations, there are several possible ways to explain the 
coefficients in the regression outcomes from the data of 2009, 2010 and 2011. Firstly, there 
could be no private information or individuals could decide not to use this only 
dimensional private information to guide their choice of Medigap coverage. Therefore, the 
positive correlation result only reflects moral hazard. For 2010 and 2011, the magnitude of 
moral hazard is small and not significant at any conventional significance level. For 2009, 
the coefficient of Medigap is 0.3855 and significant at 1% level (Table 5.1), which means 
total health expenditure of those holding Medigap coverage is 47% higher than those 
without Medigap due to incentive effect. Secondly, another possibility is that individuals 
do have private information about their risk type and are able to use it, but the magnitude 
of that information is mild, and only significant for 2009, and there is no moral hazard. 
Thirdly, one more possibility is that there exist both adverse selection and moral hazard, 
and both of them are really small. Finally, the last possibility is that according to multi-
dimensional private information, private information includes but is not limited to 
individuals who know their risk type, and those individuals have private information in 
other dimensions. This results in advantageous selection. Advantageous selection offsets 
the effect or at least partial effect of moral hazard. 
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We have mentioned early that Medigap insurance market is a highly regulated by the 
government. Highly regulation on underwriting is usually proved to lead to severe 
asymmetric information. Therefore, the assumption that there is multi-dimensional private 
information sounds more reasonable. Of course, we need further empirical data 
investigation to prove our thoughts. 
 Also, if there were indeed factors rather than risk type, which are correlated with 
Medigap and the total health expenditure, relying on positive correlation test would cause 
endogeneity problem when including the related factors in the error term. 
5.2 Independent Probit model and multiple regression model 
 Fortunately, we have a variable called self-rated health in MEPS. It describes how 
individuals rate their health status. It is a natural proxy variable for self-rated risk type.  
Therefore, rather than using positive correlation test we follow the basic idea of Finkelstein 
and McGarry (2006). On one hand, we estimate the relationship between self-rated health 
and his/her subsequent health expenditure conditional on risk classification (in other words, 
conditional on premium variables) to see whether individuals correctly assess their risk 
level. On the other hand, we examine relationship between self-rated health and his/her 
Medigap insurance holdings.  
Baseline Specification 
 We estimate the following two equations independently. 
 =  !+ +    (2) 
∗ =  ! +  +   (3) 
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where ∗  is the latent variable for the binary variable Medigap  in the Probit model, i.e., 
 = (∗ > 0). The corresponding two hypotheses we would like to test are:  
Hypothesis II: The regression coefficient of self-rated health status is nonzero.   
 The null side of the above hypothesis is zero coefficient of self-rated health status, 
and the alternative one is nonzero coefficient of self-rated health status. 
Hypothesis III: The correlation between Medigap coverage and self-rated health is 
nonzero. 
 In this hypothesis, we have the null side with the zero correlation between Medigap 
coverage and self-rated health is zero, and the alternative one is the nonzero correlation. 
 Self-rated health status is an ordinal categorical variable. In the Probit model, the 
group of individuals who report that they are "excellent" in health status is omitted. 
Comparing with those who report "excellent", individuals who report "very good" are less 
likely to have Medigap coverage. After controlling premium variables if risk type is the 
only private information left for individuals to make decisions then we expect less risky 
individuals choose less health coverage. If not, it implies the private information is not uni-
dimensional. In that case we would like to see what other factors that could affect choice of 
coverage and the logarithm of the total expenditure. The extensive specification is as 
follows.  
Extensive Specification 
 =  !++&''()&*+ +       (4) 
∗ =  ! + +&''()&*+ +   (5) 
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5.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and EM algorithm 
 In the independent models, one issue that has not been addressed is there could be 
correlation between error terms in the two equations.  If the error terms are not correlated, 
then estimate the two equations jointly or independently would equally efficient. If the 
error terms of two equations are correlated, jointly estimating the two equations 
simultaneously is more efficient.  Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) are proposed 
for this purpose and it is based on the assumption that two dependent variables are 
continuous variables or at least can be treated as continuous variables. Bivariate Probit 
model is proposed to handle the situation when the two jointly estimated equations are 
with binary dependent variables. In our model, Medigap coverage is a binary variable and 
the logarithm of the total health expenditure is continuous; therefore, neither SUR nor 
bivariate Probit model is ready to be used without any adjustment in our case. 
 In order to fit one continuous variable and one binary variable in SUR model, we 
first estimate the continuous latent variable in the Probit model. Then we use estimated 
latent variable and the logarithm of the total expenditure as the two continuous dependent 
variables in the SUR.  We adopt EM algorithm to estimate the latent variable.  
 EM (expectation-maximization) algorithm is one iterative statistical method to 
estimate parameters of statistical models with maximizing the expected value of log-
likelihood. It has wide application to estimate parameters with missing variables 
(Dempster, Laird. and Rubin, 1977). In brief, EM-iterations include two steps: an 
expectation (E) step and a maximization (M) step. Suppose that  is the observed variables 
and , is the unobserved hidden variables, and we need to estimate the parameter - in the 
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statistical model with likelihood function .(-; , ,) . In the E-step, we calculate the 
expected value of the log-likelihood function 0 with respect to the conditional distribution 
of , given  at the 1th  step with -((): 
02-3, -(()4 = 5678	.(-; , ,)3, -(()9. 
Then in the M-step, the maximization of 0 is calculated to find the next step -((:): 
-((:) = ;	<;=>02-3, -(()4. 
 For Probit model, we model the observed  as (∗ > 0) where ∗ is the hidden 
variable and furthermore we can assume that ∗ =  + , where  ∼ @(0,1). Since we 
only observe  and ∗ is hidden, we can use EM algorithm to estimate the parameter  in 
the Probit model. In the E-step, we have  
023, , (()4 = 5678	.(; , ∗)3, , (()9 
= − C2 log(2H) −
1
2 5[∥ 
∗ −  ∥K |, , (()] 
= − C2 log(2H) −
1
2 52
∗M∗3, (()4 + NN52∗3, (()4 − 12 
NN 
Denote that O2, (()4 = 52∗3, (()4. In the M-step, we maximize 0(|, , (()) and 
have 
((:) = (N)PNO2, (()4, 
which is the exact linear regression solution after regressing O(, (()) on . When  = 1, 
we have 
O2 = 1, (()4 = 52∗3 = 1, (()4 
= 5( + | = 1, (()) 
= (() + 5(| > −, (()) 
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= (() − 5(| < , (()) 
= (() −
R S√2H
UV(W)
PX YPZ
[/K]S
Φ((())  
= (() +
R 1√2H ]Y
PZ[/KUV(W)
PX
Φ((())  
= (() + _(
(())
Φ((()), 
where _(S)  and Φ(S)  are the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative 
density function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution respectively. Similarly we have 
O2 = 0, (()4 = (() − _2
(()4
1 − Φ((()). 
Therefore, in general, we have 
O2, (()4 = (() + _(
(())
Φ((())[1 − Φ((())] 6 − Φ2
(()49. 
 In our statistical model, denote the logarithm of the total expenditure observation as 
 and Medigap observation as . We need to consider the correlation structure between 
two variables. We model  through the Probit model, the correlation now can be solved 
through seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) between  and ∗ : 
 =  +  ,  (6) 
∗ =  + , (7) 
where the correlation `, between  and  is estimated. By considering SUR and the 
Probit model jointly, we can revise the EM algorithm for the Probit model to incorporate 
SUR as the following: 
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• E-step: find the expected ∗  with respect to ,  and 
(()
: 
Oa, 
(()b = 
(() + _(
(())
Φa
(()b[1 − Φa
(()b]
c − Φa
(()bd. 
• M-step: use SUR with response variables   and O(, 
(()) and predictors  to 
find 
((:) and 
((:)
. 
 We run the above EM algorithm till converge when ∥ ((:) − (() ∥ +∥ ((:) −
(() ∥≤ 10Pf. 
 In the following joint regression model,  
 =  + ’ 
∗ =  + , 
we estimate the two regression model simultaneously by controlling premium variables 
only, and controlling both premium variables and additional variables. The correlation h 
between the two regression errors  and  reflects relation between Medigap coverage 
and the total health expenditure conditional on corresponding controlling variables. 
 Note: Equations (6) and (7) are simplified version of Equations (2) and (3) and 
Equations (4) and (5) are for the sake of formula derivation.  
  
  
 
38
CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS 
6.1 Independent Multiple Linear Regression Model and Probit Model 
Self-rated health 
 In Table 6.4, by conditioning on only premium variables (sex, age and smoking 
status), we can see that there is significant increase of the logarithm of the total health 
expenditure when self-rated health changes from "excellent" to "poor". Comparing to 
"excellent", the total expenditure of those with "very good" self-rated health is around 
36.86% higher on average, the total expenditure of those with "good" self-rated health is 
around 65.76% higher, the total expenditure of those with "fair" is around 107.3% higher 
and the total expenditure of those with "poor" self-rated health is almost 189% higher.  
 Controlling additional variables such as risk aversion, cognitive limitations, 
education and poverty categories, we still find strong and significant pattern of self-
selected health status on the logarithm of total health expenditure. 
 It demonstrates that individuals are in general quite informed about their health 
status conditional risk classification assessed by insurance companies and there is still 
large residual private information. Meanwhile, much stronger positive correlation shows 
after controlling premium variables plus additional variables. It implies that this is private 
information exists across individuals from different social status level and this is even 
much stronger within each group. Similar pattern holds for the results of both 2010 data 
and 2011 data as we can see from Table 6.5 and Table 6.6.   
 In Table 6.7, using Probit model with Medigap as dependent variable, we do not 
find strong correlation between self-rated health with Medigap purchase. All of the 
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coefficients are negative, however, most of them are not significant at any conventional 
significant level irrespectively of controlling only premium variables or premium variables 
plus additional variables.  Only the coefficient of self-rated health at "Very Good" is 
significant at 10% level.  
 From Table 6.8, Table 6.9 of both 2010 data and 2011 data, we find the coefficients 
are negative and most of them are significant when controlling premium variables or 
premium variables plus additional variables.  
 According to the information provided from Table 6.4 to 6.9, we find that 
individuals are quite informed about their health status and they have private information 
that insurance companies do not use. At the same time self-rated health is not positive 
correlated with Medigap purchase regardless of controlling only premium variables or 
controlling premium variables, risk aversion, cognitive limitation, education, and poverty 
categories as well. In other words, we find individuals have private information of their 
risk type, but fail to find the existence of adverse selection conditional on these variables.  
 Next, we will examine the effect of several potential factors that have been 
frequently appeared in study of insurance market selection effect.  
Risk Aversion 
 Risk aversion is a factor, which is most frequently examined in the previous studies 
in various insurance markets. It shows that risk aversion plays an important role in 
individuals' choice of insurance in some cases. Those who are very risk averse are more 
likely to purchase insurance even though their risk type is very low.  
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 In MEPS, individuals are asked to rate their "likelihood to take risk". Answers of 
risk aversion are leveled from "disagree strongly", "disagree somewhat ", "uncertain" 
"agree somewhat" to "agree strongly". As we can see from the Table 6.4 to Table 6.6 most 
of the coefficients are negative and at least half of them are not significant at any 
conventional level. Therefore, it implies that those individuals who are more risk averse do 
not necessarily have less health expenditure than those with less risk averse.  
 There could be several possibilities for this scenario. In one possible situation, 
individuals with higher tolerance of risk are sick, but there are less likely to see a doctor 
and then less health expenditure occurs. If that is the case, their lower expenditure does not 
reflect that they are lower in risk. Another possibility is that risk aversion is not universal 
across various aspects. Willing or not willing to take risk in general does not consistently 
reflect individuals’ attitude toward risk of health. This could also explain why we do not 
see that individuals with risk averse in general case do not have less health expenditure.  
 In addition, from the results of the Probit models we can find that more risk 
aversion does not seem to systematically correlate with Medigap purchase either. In 2009 
data, the coefficients of risk aversion at different level are negative. In 2010 data, most of 
the coefficients of risk aversion are positive. All of the coefficients are not significant at 
any significant level. Either risk aversion is not that important in making choice of 
Medigap insurance or risk aversion surveyed in MEPS are not reflecting individuals 
attitude toward health risk. 
Cognitive limitation and Education 
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 Individuals with cognitive limitation have significantly higher total health 
expenditure than those without cognitive limitation. The percentage of increment ranges 
around 38.7% to 75.2%within these three years. 
 Effect of education is relatively small, which ranges from 5% to 11%. This means 
additional years' education ceteris paribus is positively correlated with total health 
expenditure. Generally speaking, we expect that better education would be correlated with 
better health status. Especially there are evidences about this in several previous studies. 
Possible explanation for this counter-intuition result could be that those with better 
education understand health and health insurance better than those with lower education 
level; therefore, ceteris paribus, those with better education tend to be more likely to utilize 
health service and therefore generate more health expenditure.  
 For Medigap purchase, we do not get consistent result from the data of 2009, 2010 
and 2011 regarding cognitive limitations. In the data of 2009 and 2010, those with 
cognitive limitations are less likely than those without cognitive limitations to purchase 
Medigap insurance before we control poverty categories, and this is consistent with results 
of study from Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008). After we control poverty categories, the 
coefficients become not significant. We do not find such correlation between cognitive 
limitation and Medigap purchase in 2011 data. 
Similar for education, in the data of 2009 and 2010, it shows that years of education and 
Medigap purchase are positively correlated and significant, and this is as expected. In the 
data of 2011, we do not find such correlation.  
Poverty Categories 
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 Economic status is also an important factor to look at in studying selection effect. 
Economics status is often found in some of former studies to have negative correlation 
with health expenditure and positive correlation with choice of health insurance. We do not 
find any significant correlation between total health expenditure and poverty categories in 
any year from 2009 to 2011. 
 In the data of 2009, we do not find significant correlation between the income level 
and Medigap purchase. In the data of 2010 and 2011, individuals with higher income level 
are significantly more likely than those with lower income level to purchase Medigap. For 
example, in the data of 2011, comparing to those who are in poor or negative category, the 
coefficient of those who are in high category is 0.8735 and significant at 1% level. It 
implies that those in high-income category have average marginal probability 8.5% higher 
than those in poor/negative income category. Other than that when we add poverty 
categories, coefficients of cognitive limitation become not significant at any conventional 
level in the data of 2009 and 2010.  
6.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Model 
 To examine whether there is correlation between errors between Medigap coverage 
and the total health expenditure, SUR model is more efficient.  
Self-Rated Health 
 We still find significant positive correlation between the self-rated health status and 
the logarithm of total health expenditure, which implies individuals’ private information of 
their risk type. Most of the coefficients of self-rated health on Medigap purchase in SUR 
become negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficients from SUR and 
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independent models are very tiny. The major difference of using SUR and independent 
models are the shrinking of standard errors especially for self-rated health status on 
Medigap coverage. 
 Combining findings above, the scenario can be explained in this way. First, there is 
advantageous selection effect in Medigap insurance market. Since we first do not control 
the correlation between errors, we cannot reject that coefficient of self-rated health on 
Medigap purchase is different from 0 in independent model. After we do that, we 
immediately see the coefficients becomes significant.   
 Second, there is moral hazard in Medigap insurance market. Before we use SUR to 
control error terms in the logarithm of total expenditure and Medigap purchase, we do not 
find evidence of adverse selection in the data of 2009. After we control error term 
correlation in SUR, we find advantageous selection in all the three years. Existence of 
moral hazard mitigates the negative correlation between the total health expenditure and 
Medigap purchase due to advantageous selection.  
Risk aversion 
 In the SUR models, we still do not observe consistent and stable effects from risk 
aversion.  
Cognitive limitation and Education 
 Cognitive limitation is positively and significantly correlated with the total health 
expenditure in all three years, and it is negatively and significantly correlated with 
Medigap purchase only in the data of 2009 and 2010. In the data of 2011, the correlation 
between cognitive limitation and Medigap is almost zero and not significant. Therefore, if 
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cognitive limitation serves as the source of advantageous selection, it only works for 2009 
and 2010.  
 Education is positively correlated with the total health expenditure and positively 
correlated with Medigap purchase in all three year. Thus, in this study we do not find years 
of education as source of advantageous selection.  
Poverty Categories 
 Poverty categories do not have positive or negative correlation with health in terms 
of total the health expenditure. However, better economic status is associated with higher 
possibility to purchase Medigap. Thus, economics status does not work as source of 
advantageous selection as well.   
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics-2009 
 All Without 
Medigap 
With 
Medigap(premium 
paid on their own) 
With 
Medigap 
(premium  
not paid on 
their own) 
Age 74.55 74.47 74.87 74.92 
Female   0.564   0.562   0.583   0.570 
Smoke   0.091   0.099   0.065   0.054 
Income 52,246.40 51,117.84 57,741.45 56,991.16 
Education 12.240 12.043 13.379 12.967 
Married 0.544  0.539 0.539 0.584 
Race     
   White 0.872 0.861 0.942 0.909 
   Black 0.080 0.086 0.040 0.059 
  Other    
Races  
0.048 0.053 0.018 0.032 
Expenditure 9,581.02 9,438.13 10,260.24 10,191.36 
ER  0.238 0.228 0.233 0.312 
Seatbelt 1.332 1.355 1.217 1.237 
Risk Aversion 2.350 2.369 2.370 2.206 
SR health 2.725 2.755 2.635 2.562 
Cognition 0.106 0.114 0.068 0.069 
Medigap  0 1 2 
Sample size 2,295 1,945 128 222 
Weighted size 24,070,045 19,652,559 1,624,905 2,792,580 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics-2010 
 All Without 
Medigap 
With Medigap 
(premium paid on 
their own) 
With 
Medigap 
(premium  
not paid on 
their own) 
Age  74.595 74.577 75.384 74.398 
Female    0.568   0.561   0.546   0.549 
Smoke    0.097   0.099   0.083   0.087 
Income 54,166.73 52,769.70 70,418.46 54,864.11 
Education 12.448 12.276 13.238 13.298 
Married 0.566 0.561 0.644 0.561 
Race     
   White 0.870 0.858 0.946 0.912 
   Black 0.082 0.090 0.023 0.058 
  Other    
Races  
0.048 0.052 0.030 0.030 
Expenditure 9,912.59 9,701.67 8,737.73 12,307.70 
ER  0.246 0.245 0.209 0.279 
Seatbelt 1.349 1.356 1.163 1.418 
Risk Aversion 2.228 2.243 2.115 2.180 
SR health 2.693 2.734 2.504 2.489 
Cognition 0.097 0.105 0.054 0.066 
Medigap  0 1 2 
Sample size 2,213 1,914 118 181 
Weighted size 24,662,204 20,415,159 1,643,182 2,603,863 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics-2011 
 All Without 
Medigap 
With 
Medigap(premium 
paid on their own) 
With 
Medigap 
(premium  
not paid on 
their own) 
Age 74.216 74.298 74.360 73.632 
Female     .562     .553     .579     .609 
Smoke     .097     .102     .116     .055 
Income 56,276.10 54,876.32 55,847.18 65,186.21 
Education 12.453 12.230 13.255 13.548 
Married 0.553 0.548  0.563  0.575 
Race     
   White 0.870 0.849 0.971 0.947 
   Black 0.086 0.099 0.013 0.042 
  Other    
Races  
0.045 0.052 0.016 0.011 
Expenditure 9,718.61 9,752.35 10,497.76 9,106.77 
ER  0.232 0.231 0.196 0.257 
Seatbelt 1.385 1.393 1.567 1.245 
Risk Aversion 2.295 2.280  2.463 2.296 
SR health 2.675 2.752 2.248 2.420 
Cognition 0.101 0.110 0.069 0.062 
Medigap  0 1 2 
Sample size 2,257 1,921 109 227 
Weighted size 24,729,641 19,874,074 1,653,731 3,201,835 
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Table 6.4 Log-linear Regression Results of 2009 Data 
Log-linear regression with logarithm of total expenditure as the dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good  .3686*** 
(.1287) 
 .3698*** 
(.1267) 
 .3750*** 
(.1272) 
 .3911*** 
(.1272) 
 .3922*** 
(.1266) 
Good   .6576*** 
(.1430) 
 .6627*** 
(.1421) 
 .6579*** 
(.1405) 
 .7799*** 
(.1400) 
 .7882*** 
(.1387) 
Fair 1.073*** 
(.1584) 
1.080*** 
(.1564) 
1.024*** 
(.1567) 
1.192*** 
(.1564) 
1.198*** 
(.1541) 
Poor 1.892*** 
(.1798) 
1.922*** 
(.1782) 
1.801*** 
(.1851) 
2.008*** 
(.1859) 
2.020*** 
(.1887) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.1720 
(.1334) 
-.1563 
(.1334) 
-.1811 
(.1296) 
-.1773 
(.1296) 
Uncertain  -.1853 
(.1606) 
-.1938 
(.1591) 
-.1925 
(.1545) 
-.1883 
(.1538) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.1506 
(.1401) 
-.1324 
(.1408) 
-.1556* 
(.1334) 
-.1343 
(.1301) 
Agree 
strongly 
 -.7016** 
(.2928) 
-.6651** 
(.2890) 
-.5761** 
(.4177) 
-.5805* 
(.4210) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .3987*** 
(.1350) 
 .4606*** 
(.1255) 
 .4930*** 
(.1273) 
Education 
 
    .0932*** 
(.0106) 
 .0907*** 
(.0121) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor     -.3191 
(.2755) 
Low income     -.0165 
(.1758) 
Middle 
income 
     .0504 
(.1372) 
High income      .0593 
(.1463) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.  
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Table 6.5 Log-linear Regression Results of 2010 Data 
Log-linear regression with logarithm of total expenditure as the dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good  .3511** 
(.1452) 
 .3620** 
(.1396) 
 .3668** 
(.1399) 
 .3948*** 
(.1332) 
 .4186*** 
(.1342) 
Good   .6962*** 
(.1641) 
 .7210*** 
( .1627) 
 .6991*** 
(.1633) 
 .8378*** 
(.1556) 
 .8660*** 
(.1571) 
Fair 1.415*** 
(.1642) 
1.455*** 
(.1628) 
1.407*** 
(.1676) 
1.627*** 
(.1627) 
1.680*** 
(.1647) 
Poor 1.659*** 
(.2167) 
1.728*** 
(.2140) 
1.643*** 
(.2185) 
1.934*** 
(.2276) 
2.005*** 
(.2237) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.2296 
(.1729) 
-.2116 
(.1724) 
-.2672 
(.1722) 
-.2577 
(.1719) 
uncertain  -.3393** 
(.1633) 
-.3300* 
(.1622) 
-.3047** 
(.1534) 
-.2830* 
(.1547) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.0861 
(.1428) 
-.0769 
(.1420) 
-.0962 
(.1355) 
-.0924 
(.1354) 
Agree strongly  -.4226 
(.3648) 
-.4216 
(.3648) 
-.2968 
(.3407) 
-.2438 
(.3507) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .3870*** 
(.1323) 
 .5248*** 
(.1329) 
 .5294*** 
(.1328) 
education 
 
    .1122*** 
(.0149) 
 .1044*** 
(.0155) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor     -.2272 
(.2932) 
Low income     -.0707 
(.2091) 
Middle income      .0698 
(.1930) 
High income      .2067 
(.1890) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.6 Log-linear Regression Results of 2011 Data 
Log-linear regression with logarithm total expenditure as the dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good  .2014 
(.1675) 
 .2060 
(.1654) 
 .2088 
(.1651) 
 .2781 
(.1684) 
 .3058* 
(.1714) 
Good   .4938*** 
(.1479) 
 .4919*** 
( .1481) 
 .4817*** 
(.1454) 
 .5937*** 
(.1447) 
 .6200*** 
(.1514) 
Fair 1.160*** 
(.1626) 
1.175*** 
(.1573) 
1.063*** 
(.1600) 
1.239*** 
(.1597) 
1.279*** 
(.1655) 
Poor 1.995*** 
(.2005) 
2.029*** 
(.2001) 
1.805*** 
(.2008) 
2.046*** 
(.2022) 
2.110*** 
(.2158) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
  .0069 
(.1694) 
 .0236 
(.1701) 
-.0008 
(.1716) 
-.0016 
(.1709) 
uncertain  -.3741* 
(.2128) 
-.3738* 
(.2103) 
-.3687* 
(.2046) 
-.3659* 
(.2042) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.2518* 
(.1611) 
-.2279 
(.1607) 
-.2595 
(.1590) 
-.2624 
(.1599) 
Agree strongly  -.5633* 
(.2883) 
-.5166* 
(.2889) 
-.4840* 
(.2941) 
-.4511 
(.2977) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .6813*** 
(.1212) 
 .7519*** 
(.1239) 
 .7427*** 
(.1233) 
education 
 
    .0878*** 
(.0146) 
 .0811*** 
(.0145) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor      .1600 
(.1771) 
Low income     -.0069 
(.1583) 
Middle income      .1757 
(.1385) 
High income      .2380 
(.1708) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.7 Probit Model Results of 2009 Data 
Medigap purchase (binary variable) as dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good -.3231* 
(.1728) 
-.3209* 
(.1739) 
-.3269 
(.1738) 
-.3105* 
(.1765) 
-.3129* 
(.1767) 
Good  -.2552 
(.1722) 
-.2627 
( .1703) 
-.2592 
(.1703) 
-.1923* 
(.1717) 
-.1839 
(.1696) 
Fair -.1600 
(.1651) 
-.1604 
(.1656) 
-.1262 
(.1671) 
-.0348 
(.1720) 
-.0284 
(.1716) 
Poor -.3659 
(.2398) 
-.3639 
(.2400) 
-.2747 
(.2424) 
-.1553 
(.2469) 
-.1539 
(.2460) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
  .0328 
(.1474) 
 .0213 
(.1473) 
 .0020 
(.1452) 
-.0001 
(.1466) 
uncertain   .1431 
(.1570) 
 .1558 
(.1555) 
 .1485 
(.1582) 
 .1547 
(.1572) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 .0783 
(.1574) 
.0720 
(.1583) 
.0557 
(.1607) 
.0680 
(.1639) 
Agree strongly  -.0309 
(.2512) 
-.0552 
(.2528) 
 .0557 
(.2519) 
 .0062 
(.2504) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.3128** 
(.1767) 
-.2821** 
(.1824) 
-.2509 
(.1857) 
education 
 
    .0589*** 
(.0180) 
 .0536*** 
(.0173) 
Poverty  
Categories  
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor     -.0763 
(.3051) 
Low income      .2191 
(.2325) 
Middle income      .2276 
(.2122) 
High income      .2560 
(.2183) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.8 Probit Model Results of 2010 Data 
Medigap purchase (binary variable) as dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good -3932** 
(.1868) 
-.3999** 
(.1849) 
-.4019** 
(.1845) 
-.3915** 
(.1853) 
-.3954** 
(.1874) 
Good  -.3484* 
(.1980) 
-.3483* 
(.1967) 
-.3334* 
(.1984) 
-.2906 
(.2003) 
-.2776 
(.2031) 
Fair -.5484*** 
(.1912) 
-.5589*** 
(.1916) 
-.5169*** 
(.1914) 
-.4521** 
(.1929) 
-.4177** 
(.1905) 
Poor -.2492 
(.2944) 
-.2391 
(.2932) 
-.1637 
(.2988) 
-.0704 
(.3007) 
-.0029 
(.2976) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.0725 
(.1619) 
-.0890 
(.1616) 
-.1129 
(.1628) 
-.0756 
(.1642) 
uncertain  -.2444 
(.1740) 
-.2578 
(.1740) 
-.2608 
(.1740) 
-.2236 
(.1716) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.1367 
(.2015) 
-.1504 
(.2009) 
-.1721 
(.1986) 
-.1882 
(.2004) 
Agree strongly   .0664 
(.3138) 
 .0692 
(.3148) 
 .1157 
(.3131) 
 .2719 
(.3185) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.3892** 
(.2024) 
-.3483* 
(.2067) 
-.3064 
(.2117) 
education 
 
    .0423*** 
(.0154) 
 .0255* 
(.0153) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor      .4667 
(.3032) 
Low income      .8709*** 
(.2388) 
Middle income      .7967*** 
(.2760) 
High income     1.0519*** 
(.2621) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.9 Probit Model Results of 2011 Data 
Medigap purchase (binary variable) as dependent variable 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very good  .0517 
(.1918) 
 .0916 
(.1790) 
 .0916 
(.1784) 
 .1114 
(.1748) 
 .1536 
(.1725) 
Good  -.3192* 
(.1866) 
-.2777 
( .1727) 
-.2777 
(.1726) 
-.2462 
(.1695) 
-.1871 
(.1704) 
Fair -.6268** 
(.2613) 
-.6012** 
(.2514) 
-.6011** 
(.2507) 
-.5597** 
(.2518) 
-.5021* 
(.2554) 
Poor -.9042*** 
(.3349) 
-.8743*** 
(.3346) 
-.8742** 
(.3501) 
-.8104** 
(.3435) 
-.7405** 
(.3452) 
Risk aversion      
Disagree 
strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
  .0248 
(.1581) 
 .0248 
(.1562) 
 .0223 
(.1569) 
 .0078 
(.1553) 
uncertain  -.1678 
(.2307) 
-.1678 
(.2290) 
-.1719 
(.2300) 
-.1665 
(.2310) 
Agree 
somewhat 
  .3189 
(.2125) 
 .3189 
(.2085) 
 .3098 
(.2098) 
 .2921 
(.2036) 
Agree strongly  .1487 
(.3042) 
.1487 
(.3036) 
-.1556 
(.3056) 
.2125  
(.3152) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.0003 
(.2249) 
-.0059 
(.2266) 
 .0101 
(.2283) 
education 
 
    .0222 
(.0208) 
 .0106 
(.0203) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/negative      
Near poor      .7195*** 
(.1993) 
Low income      .6854*** 
(.2119) 
Middle income     .6046** 
(.2401) 
High income      .8735*** 
(.2285) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.10-Table 6.12 show the result from SUR models from 2009 to 2011.  
Table 6.10 Seemingly Unrelated Regression of 2009 Data 
Dept Var: Logarithm of total health expenditure  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good  .3686*** 
(.1358) 
 .3698*** 
(1350) 
 .3750*** 
(.1347) 
 .3911*** 
(.1325) 
 .3922*** 
(.1324) 
Good  .6576*** 
(.1330) 
 .6627*** 
(.1322) 
 .6579*** 
(.1314) 
 .7799*** 
(.1305) 
 .7882*** 
(1309) 
Fair  1.073*** 
(.1495) 
1.080*** 
(.1485) 
1.024*** 
(.1496) 
1.192*** 
(.1485) 
1.198*** 
(.1492) 
Poor  1.892*** 
(.1942) 
1.922*** 
(.1930) 
1.801*** 
(.1975) 
2.008*** 
(.1957) 
2.020*** 
(.1973) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.1720 
(.1228) 
-.1563 
(.1227) 
-.1811 
(.1207) 
-.1773 
(.1207) 
Uncertain   -.1853 
(.1316) 
-.1938 
(.1314) 
-.1925 
(.1292) 
-.1883 
(.1291) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.1506 
(.1347) 
-.1324 
(.1346) 
-.1556 
(.1312) 
-.1343 
(.1325) 
Agree 
strongly  
 -.7016*** 
(.2441) 
-.6651*** 
(.2440) 
-.5761** 
(.2402) 
-.5805** 
(.2400) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .3987*** 
(.1426) 
 .4606*** 
(.1404) 
 .4930*** 
(.1411) 
education     .0932*** 
(.0110) 
 .0907*** 
(.0115) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Pool     -.3191 
(.1958) 
Low income     -.0165 
(.1619) 
Middle 
Income 
     .0504 
(.1498) 
High Income      .0593 
(.1527) 
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1) Standard error in parentheses 
2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Dept. Var: Medigap purchase (binary variable)  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good -.3231*** 
(.0380) 
-.3209*** 
(.0380) 
-.3269*** 
(.0379) 
-.3105*** 
(.0375) 
-..3129*** 
(.0374) 
Good -.2552*** 
(.0372) 
-.2627*** 
(.0372) 
-.2592*** 
(.0371) 
-.1923*** 
(.0370) 
-.1839*** 
(.0370) 
Fair  -.1600*** 
(.0418) 
-.1604*** 
(.0418) 
-.1262*** 
(.0421) 
-.0348 
(.0421) 
-.0284 
(.0422) 
Poor  -.3659*** 
(.0543) 
-.3639*** 
(.0544) 
-.2747** 
(.0556) 
-.1553*** 
(.0555) 
-.1539*** 
(.0558) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.0328 
(.0346) 
 .0213 
(.0345) 
 .0020 
(.0342) 
 .0001 
(.0341) 
Uncertain   .1431*** 
(.0371) 
 .1558*** 
(.0370) 
 .1485*** 
(.0366) 
 .1547*** 
(.0365) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.0783** 
(.0379) 
.0720 
(.0379) 
.0557 
(.0375) 
 .0680* 
(.0375) 
Agree 
strongly  
 -.0309 
(.0688) 
-.0552 
(.0678) 
 .0050 
(.0681) 
 .0062 
(.0679) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.3128*** 
(.0794) 
-.2821*** 
(.0398) 
-.2509*** 
(.0399) 
education     .0589*** 
(.0031) 
 .0536 
(.0032) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Poor     -.0763 
(.0554) 
Low income      .2191*** 
(.0458) 
Middle 
Income 
     .2276*** 
(.0424) 
High Income      .2560*** 
(.0432) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.11 Seemingly Unrelated Regression of 2010 Data 
Dept Var: Logarithm of total health expenditure  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good  .3512** 
(.1426) 
 .3614** 
(.1419) 
 .3664*** 
(.1417) 
 .3945*** 
(.1386) 
 .4177*** 
(.1388) 
Good  .6974*** 
(.1396) 
 .7217*** 
(.1395) 
 .6995*** 
(.1395) 
 .8393*** 
(.1372) 
 .8667*** 
(.1374) 
Fair  1.418*** 
(.1587) 
1.455*** 
(.1585) 
1.407*** 
(.1594) 
1.629*** 
(.1575) 
1.681*** 
(.1568) 
Poor  1.663*** 
(.2150) 
1.730*** 
(.2143) 
1.644*** 
(.2166) 
1.937*** 
(.2138) 
2.007*** 
(.2154) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.2304* 
(.1287) 
-.2123* 
(.1287) 
-.2683** 
(.1177) 
-.2590** 
(.1259) 
Uncertain   -.3576** 
(.1401) 
-.3484** 
(.1399) 
-.3240** 
(.1368) 
-.3027** 
(.1370) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.0878 
(.1435) 
-.0785 
(.1433) 
-.0980 
(.1401) 
-.0943 
(.1400) 
Agree 
strongly  
 -.4234 
(.2792) 
-.4223 
(.2787) 
-.2967 
(.1401) 
-.2448 
(.2730) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .3907** 
(.1528) 
 .5297*** 
(.1501) 
 .5341*** 
(.1501) 
education     .1130*** 
(.0116) 
 .1054*** 
(.0120) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Poor     -.2227 
(.2163) 
Low income     -.0699 
(.1676) 
Middle 
Income 
     .0696 
(.1555) 
High Income      .2017 
(.1574) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Dept. Var: Medigap purchase (binary variable)  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good -.3932*** 
(.0380) 
-.3999*** 
(.0379) 
-.4019*** 
(.0378) 
-.3815*** 
(.0376) 
-.3954*** 
(.0371) 
Good -.3484*** 
(.0372) 
-.3483*** 
(.0373) 
-.3334*** 
(.0372) 
-.2906*** 
(.0372) 
-.2776*** 
(.0367) 
Fair  -.5484*** 
(.0422) 
-.5589*** 
(.0424) 
-.5169*** 
(.0425) 
-.4521*** 
(.0427) 
-.4177*** 
(.0424) 
Poor  -.2492*** 
(.0572) 
-.2391*** 
(.0573) 
-.1637*** 
(.0578) 
-.0704 
(.0580) 
-.0029 
(.0576) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
 -.0725** 
(.0344) 
-.0890** 
(.0343) 
-.1129*** 
(.0342) 
-.0756** 
(.0336) 
Uncertain   -.2444*** 
(.0374) 
-.2578*** 
(.0373) 
-.2608*** 
(.0371) 
-.2236*** 
(.0366) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.1367*** 
(.0383) 
-.1504*** 
(.0382) 
-.1721*** 
(.0380) 
-.1882*** 
(.0374) 
Agree 
strongly  
  .0664 
(.0746) 
 .0692 
(.0744) 
 .1157 
(.0740) 
 .2719*** 
(.0730) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.3892*** 
(.0408) 
-.3483*** 
(.0407) 
-.3064*** 
(.0401) 
education     .0423*** 
(.0031) 
 .0255*** 
(.0032) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Poor      .4667*** 
(.0578) 
Low income      .8709*** 
(.0448) 
Middle 
Income 
    .7967*** 
(.0416) 
High Income     1.0519*** 
(.0421) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 6.12 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of 2011 Data 
Dept Var: Logarithm of total health expenditure  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good  .2014 
(.1389) 
 .2060 
(.1383) 
 .2088 
(.1376) 
 .2781** 
(.1361) 
 .3060** 
(.1367) 
Good  .4936*** 
(.1366) 
 .4915*** 
(.1363) 
 .4814*** 
(.1356) 
 .5934*** 
(.1346) 
 .6199*** 
(.1358) 
Fair  1.160*** 
(.1574) 
1.174*** 
(.1569) 
1.0625*** 
(.1580) 
1.283*** 
(.1576) 
1.278*** 
(.1591) 
Poor  1.994*** 
(.2066) 
2.029*** 
(.2064) 
1.804*** 
(.2110) 
2.045*** 
(.2107) 
2.109*** 
(.2128) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
  .0067 
(.1240) 
 .0234 
(.1234) 
-.0011 
(.1218) 
-.0013 
(.1217) 
Uncertain   -.3780*** 
(.1348) 
-.3777*** 
(.1341) 
-.3719*** 
(.1323) 
-.3689*** 
(.1323) 
Agree 
somewhat 
 -.2521* 
(.1432) 
-.2282* 
(.1425) 
-.2599* 
(.1407) 
-.2628* 
(.1407) 
Agree 
strongly  
 -.5632** 
(.2882) 
-.5166* 
(.2869) 
-.4840* 
(.2831) 
-.4508 
(.2838) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
   .6814*** 
(.1476) 
 .7520*** 
(.1459) 
 .7427*** 
(.1459) 
education     .0878*** 
(.0117) 
 
 .0811*** 
(.0122) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Poor      .1602 
(.2084) 
Low income     -.0081 
(.1680) 
Middle 
Income 
     .1756 
(.1590) 
High Income      .2386 
(.1609) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
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2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0. 
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Dept. Var: Medigap purchase (binary variable)  
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5  
Self-rated 
health  
     
Excellent      
Very Good  .0517 
(.0378) 
 .0916** 
(.0378) 
 .0916** 
(.0378) 
 .1114*** 
(.0749) 
 .1536** 
(.0376) 
Good -.3192*** 
(.0373) 
-.2777*** 
(.0372) 
-.2777*** 
(.0372) 
-.2462*** 
(.0374) 
-.1871*** 
(.0374) 
Fair  -.6268*** 
(.0430) 
-.6012*** 
(.0429) 
-.6011*** 
(.0434) 
-.5597*** 
(.0438) 
-.5021*** 
(.0438) 
Poor  -.9042*** 
(.0564) 
-.8743*** 
(.0564) 
-.8742*** 
(.0580) 
-.8104*** 
(.0586) 
-.7405*** 
(.0586) 
Risk Aversion      
Disagree 
Strongly 
     
Disagree 
somewhat 
  .0248 
(.0339) 
 .0248 
(.0339) 
 .0223 
(.0338) 
 .0078 
(.0335) 
Uncertain   -.1678*** 
(.0368) 
-.1678*** 
(.0368) 
-.1719*** 
(.0368) 
-.1665*** 
(.0364) 
Agree 
somewhat 
  .3189*** 
(.0391) 
 .3189*** 
(.0391) 
 .3098*** 
(.0391) 
 .2921*** 
(.0387) 
Agree 
strongly  
  .1487* 
(.0788) 
 .1487** 
(.0788) 
-.1556** 
(.0787) 
 .2125 
(.0781) 
Cognitive 
limitations 
  -.0003 
(.405) 
 .0059 
(.0406) 
 .0101 
(.0402) 
education     .0222*** 
(.0032) 
 .0106*** 
(.0033) 
Poverty 
Categories 
     
Poor/Negative      
Near Poor      .7195*** 
(.0574) 
Low income      .6854*** 
(.0463) 
Middle 
Income 
     .6046*** 
(.0438) 
High Income      .8736*** 
(.0443) 
1) Standard error in parentheses 
2) Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
7.1 Thoughts on "premium variables"  
 In this study, we control age, gender, and smoking status and assume all of these 
three variables are used for insurance companies to set their premiums. The issue is that 
this is not always the case.  In some states, the community is used for rating premium, and 
in other states age rating is used. Community rating premium means that within a certain 
plan type, all policyholders are charged the same premium regardless of age or health 
status. For age rating, age is considered and within a plan type policyholders with different 
ages are charged with different premium. For instance, 80 years old policyholders pay 
higher premiums than policyholders whose age is 65 even though they are enrolled in same 
type of plan and live in the same community. Generally speaking, smoking status and 
gender also have an impact on premium and usually smokers pay higher premium than 
non-smokers and male pay higher premium than female. However, compared to age, the 
effect of smoking and gender is less important. 
 In our paper, we always control age, gender and smoking status (named as 
"premium variables"). It means that in some extent we overestimate the risk classification 
assessed by insurance companies and therefore underestimate the selection effect.   
7.2 Thoughts on "open enrollment period" 
 There is a 6 months open enrollment period starting from the first day of the month 
when the individual turns to age 65. Outside the open enrollment, insurance companies can 
screen potential beneficiaries based on their pre-existing health condition. Individuals may 
need to pass the requirements by the insurance companies in order to be able to buy 
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Medigap insurance. They may charge individuals higher price if they make the purchase 
during the open enrollment period.  Individuals can also be rejected by the insurance 
companies if they cannot pass the requirements for enrollment. We do not have any 
variables that can detect whether individuals were enrolled during open enrollment period.  
There is one possibility that some individuals who would like to enroll in Medigap 
coverage did not enroll in time during open enrollment period, but submitted their 
applications outside the period and got rejected by the insurance companies. In other words, 
cream skimming by the insurance companies cannot be completely ruled out.  
7.3 Thoughts on "people age under 65" 
 Those who are eligible for enrollment in Medicare under age 65 should satisfy at 
least one of the three following conditions.  
• One is that individual receives benefit from Social Security Disabled Insurance or 
Railroad Retirement Board for at least 24 months and is disabled.   
• Second, needing a kidney transplant or continuing dialysis for end stage renal 
disease (ESRD).  
• Third, individual has amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and is eligible for Social 
Security Disability Insurance. Certain plans of Medigap coverage are eligible for 
these disabled and age under 65 individuals to purchase.  
 Generally speaking, those who are under age 65 enrolled in Medicare are in worse 
condition in health compared to others. In our study, we have ruled out this relative special 
group of individuals.  
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7.4 Limitations 
 Medigap market has been standardized in 1992. The basic plan is Plan A and more 
advanced plans are introduces recently besides Plan A to D, for instance, Plan M and N 
were effective as new Medigap policies since 2010. Plan M was designed for individuals 
who would prefer lower monthly premiums for an attractive health insurance plan, but pay 
higher out of pocket medical expenses in exchange, and Plan N provides co-insurance 
payments on hospitals costs for Part A, as well as a full year of payments once Medicare 
benefits have been depleted. Coverage of Medigap varies by different plans. Coverage of 
advanced plan includes but not limit to what plan covers. Thus, treating Medigap as binary 
variable do not lose generality but lose part of the detailed information. It will be useful in 
the analysis if we were able to obtain Medigap types and treat it as a multi-level categorical 
variable instead. 
 There are multiple ways to measure realized loss, for instance, total ex post health 
expenditure, utilization of health care. Using only one-dimensional measurement of total 
health expenditure could lead to the analysis to some extent vulnerable.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we investigate the selection effect and moral hazard under 
asymmetric information in the context of Medigap insurance market. We find out the 
existence of advantageous selection and moral hazard in Medigap insurance market. 
We begin by using data of the self-rated health status, the total health expenditure 
and Medigap purchase conditioned on risk classification used by the insurance companies, 
along with elaborate controls of more additional variables such as risk aversion, cognitive 
limitation, years of education, and poverty categories to demonstrate that private 
information of risk type exists in Medigap insurance market. When we use independent 
Probit model and log linear regression model, we fail to find positive correlation between 
private information of risk type and Medigap coverage. When we use SUR model by 
considering the correlation between the residuals between the total health expenditure and 
Medigap coverage, we find negative correlation between private information of risk type 
and Medigap coverage.  
We reconcile these findings by presenting evidence of coexistence of moral hazard 
and advantageous selection in Medigap insurance market.  
Our findings also highlight that the frequently examined factor risk aversion does 
not have consistently effect across years in this study. Individuals with more education are 
more likely to have slightly higher total health expenditure and slightly more likely to have 
Medigap coverage.  Higher income individuals are more likely to have Medigap coverage, 
however, not lower in risk type at least in terms of total health expenditure. The only factor, 
which contributes to advantageous selection, is cognitive limitation. 
  
 
73
Therefore, one important direction for subsequent work is to investigate other 
potential sources that lead to advantageous selection in Medigap insurance market since 
most of those conventionally focused factors seem to have little effect. Furthermore, it is 
worth to figure out how advantageous selection would affect efficiency and welfare. 
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ABSTRACT 
SELECTION EFFECT IN MEDIGAP INSURANCE  MARKET WITH MULTI- 
DIMENSIONAL PRIVATE INFORMATION 
by 
YANG LIU 
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Advisor: Dr. Allen Goodman 
Major: Economics 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Theoretical models of insurance suggest that when individuals have private 
information about their risk type alone, insurance coverage will be adversely selected by 
those riskier individuals due to asymmetric information. In this study we investigate 
whether individuals have private information of their risk type and riskier individuals are 
indeed more likely to choose health insurance in the context of Medigap insurance market 
in the United States where government intervention reinforces information asymmetry. 
Medigap is supplemental private insurance that optional to those who have Medicare Part 
A and Part B and it is used to cover some of the cost sharing required by Medicare 
We find out that conditional on risk classification assessed by insurance companies, 
self-rated health status is positively correlated with total health expenditure and negative 
correlated with Medigap coverage. It demonstrates that people have private information 
about their risk type; however, those with worse self-rated health status less likely to 
choose Medigap coverage. This finding provides evidence that on average there is 
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advantageous selection rather than adverse selection in Medigap insurance market. 
Meanwhile, we find out coexistence of moral hazard. 
The only factor that could be potentially identified as source of advantageous 
selection in this study is cognitive limitation. Cognitive limitation is positively and 
significantly correlated with logarithm of total health expenditure in 2009, 2010 and 2011; 
at the same time, it is negatively and significantly correlated with Medigap purchase 
regardless of controlling only premium variables or premium variables plus risk aversion, 
education and poverty categories in Seemingly Unrelated Regression model in 2009 and 
2010.  
The factors that have been investigated in several previous articles such as 
education, risk aversion, poverty categories which reflect economic status seem to have 
little effect if there is any in our study. 
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